Tipos de sistemas de comércio de emissões

Ferramentas e avaliação de políticas ambientais.
Um uso mais amplo dos sistemas de comércio de emissões (ou da tributação ambiental) seria uma das maneiras mais eficientes e efetivas de promover o crescimento verde. A OCDE vem analisando e promovendo o uso de instrumentos baseados em marcadores por muitos anos. A maior parte do trabalho foi realizada sob os auspícios do antigo Grupo de Trabalho sobre Políticas Nacionais do Meio Ambiente, e recentemente renomeado o Grupo de Trabalho sobre Integração de Políticas Econômicas e Ambientais. Parte do trabalho também foi realizada sob os auspícios das Reuniões Conjuntas de Especialistas em Impostos e Meio Ambiente, onde especialistas principalmente dos ministérios das Finanças e do Meio Ambiente se reúnem duas vezes por ano. Essas reuniões estão sendo atendidas pelo Centro de Política e Análise Fiscal e Direção de Meio Ambiente da OCDE, com contribuições também de outras partes da organização.
Os sistemas de comércio de emissões contribuem para a eficiência econômica, facilitando reduções de emissões onde é mais barato para alcançá-los. Os poluidores que considerariam caro reduzir suas emissões podem comprar licenças de emissão de poluidores que podem diminuir a custos mais baixos. Em um & lsquo; perfeitamente & rsquo; mercado de trabalho, os custos de redução de uma unidade adicional de emissões seriam igualados e os custos totais de atingir um determinado objetivo ambiental seriam minimizados. As avaliações ex post de uma série de sistemas de licenças negociáveis ​​podem ser encontradas na publicação Permissões negociáveis: avaliação de políticas, design e reforma.
Existem dois principais tipos de sistemas de negociação: & ldquo; Cap-and-trade systems & rdquo; e & ldquo; sistemas de linha de base e crédito & rdquo ;. Em um sistema de cap-and-trade, um limite superior de emissões é fixado, e as licenças de emissão são leiloadas ou distribuídas gratuitamente de acordo com critérios específicos. Sob um sistema de linha de base e crédito, não existe um limite fixo para as emissões, mas os poluidores que reduzem suas emissões mais do que eles são obrigados a ganhar e lsquo; créditos & rsquo; que eles vendem para outros que precisam deles para cumprir os regulamentos a que estão sujeitos.
Em geral, a OCDE recomenda que as licenças ou subsídios de emissão em sistemas de cap-and-trade sejam leiloados em vez de distribuídos gratuitamente (& ldquo; grandfathered & rdquo;). O leilão garante que as rendas ligadas às políticas ambientais sejam atribuídas às autoridades públicas, em vez de serem capturadas pelos poluidores existentes. No entanto, na prática, a maioria das licenças foram distribuídas gratuitamente. Por outro lado, onde os impostos ambientais estão sendo usados, eles geralmente incluem alguma diferenciação nas taxas de imposto entre os poluidores. Portanto, nenhuma dessas abordagens normalmente segue & ldquo; text-book & rdquo; prescrições e o documento sobre os impostos relacionados com o meio ambiente e os sistemas de permissões negociáveis ​​em prática discute detalhadamente quais das duas alternativas melhoram do ponto de vista da eficiência econômica.
O uso atual dos sistemas de comércio de emissões (e uma série de outros instrumentos de política ambiental) está documentado em um banco de dados livremente disponível. O banco de dados fornece informações sobre os problemas ambientais abordados pelo sistema comercial, sobre o item negociado, sobre os parceiros comerciais, sobre as receitas geradas pela venda de licenças, etc. A base de dados é muito utilizada por funcionários públicos, acadêmicos, representantes da indústria, etc., e a OCDE dedica-se fortemente a avaliações regulares de políticas nos países membros e nos países parceiros.
Embora a maioria dos sistemas de comércio de emissões tenha caráter nacional ou regional, a União Européia estabeleceu um sistema comum de emissão de emissões de CO 2 (o ETS da UE), ao qual alguns outros países europeus também se ligaram. Foi também acordado em procurar vincular o RCLE da UE e um futuro sistema australiano de comércio de emissões. O protocolo de Quioto também é uma espécie de sistema de comércio internacional, que inclui tanto o & lsquo; cap-and-trade & rsquo; aspectos (como as obrigações de limitação de emissão dos países do Anexo I) e & lsquo; baseline-and-credit & rsquo; aspectos (como as possibilidades de gerar créditos através da redução de emissões, por exemplo, em países em desenvolvimento).
Em geral, a ligação dos sistemas de emissão promoverá a eficiência econômica, permitindo que a redução se realize onde é mais barato empreender. No entanto, é importante garantir que a integridade ambiental dos sistemas seja preservada quando a ligação for realizada. Com base-e-crédito & rsquo; sistemas, pode ser difícil verificar até que ponto as reduções de emissão são & lsquo; adicionais & rsquo; & ndash; isto é, em que medida eles representam algo diferente do que teria acontecido em qualquer caso.
Uma questão de preocupação com um & lsquo; cap-and-trade & rsquo; sistema, e com outros tipos de limites máximos de emissões, é quando estes são combinados com outros instrumentos & ndash; por exemplo, vários esquemas de subsídio. Existe o perigo de que os instrumentos adicionais apenas causem custos extras, sem trazer benefícios adicionais. Tais questões são discutidas em detalhes no documento Interações entre sistemas de comércio de emissões e outros instrumentos de política de sobreposição.

O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS)
O Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE explicou.
O sistema de comércio de emissões da UE (EU ETS) é uma pedra angular da política da UE para combater as alterações climáticas e a sua ferramenta chave para reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. É o primeiro mercado de carbono do mundo e continua sendo o maior.
opera em 31 países (todos os 28 países da UE, mais a Islândia, o Liechtenstein e a Noruega) limita as emissões de mais de 11 mil instalações de energia pesada (centrais eléctricas e instalações industriais) e as companhias aéreas que operam entre esses países cobre cerca de 45% dos gases de efeito estufa da UE emissões.
Para uma visão geral detalhada, veja:
Um sistema "cap and trade".
O EU ETS trabalha no princípio do "capital e do comércio".
Um limite é fixado na quantidade total de certos gases de efeito estufa que podem ser emitidos por instalações cobertas pelo sistema. A tampa é reduzida ao longo do tempo para que as emissões totais caírem.
Dentro do limite, as empresas recebem ou compram licenças de emissão que podem trocar entre si, conforme necessário. Eles também podem comprar quantidades limitadas de créditos internacionais de projetos de poupança de emissões em todo o mundo. O limite do número total de permissões disponíveis garante que eles tenham um valor.
Depois de cada ano, uma empresa deve entregar subsídios suficientes para cobrir todas as suas emissões, caso contrário multas pesadas são impostas. Se uma empresa reduz suas emissões, ela pode manter os subsídios de reposição para cobrir suas necessidades futuras, ou então vendê-las para outra empresa que não possui subsídios.
O comércio traz flexibilidade que garante que as emissões sejam reduzidas, quando menos custa. Um preço robusto do carbono também promove o investimento em tecnologias limpas e com baixas emissões de carbono.
Principais características da fase 3 (2018-2020)
O EU ETS está agora em sua terceira fase - significativamente diferente das fases 1 e 2.
As principais mudanças são:
Um único limite de emissões a nível da UE aplica-se ao sistema anterior de capitais nacionais. O leilão é o método padrão para a alocação de licenças (em vez da alocação gratuita), e as regras de alocação harmonizadas se aplicam às licenças ainda concedidas gratuitamente. Mais setores e Os gases incluíram 300 milhões de licenças reservadas na Reserva dos Novos Participantes para financiar a implantação de tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável e captura e armazenamento de carbono através do programa NER 300.
Sectores e gases abrangidos.
O sistema abrange os seguintes setores e gases com foco em emissões que podem ser medidas, reportadas e verificadas com um alto nível de precisão:
dióxido de carbono (CO 2) da geração de energia e geração de energia setores industriais intensivos em energia, incluindo refinarias de petróleo, siderúrgicas e produção de ferro, alumínio, metais, cimento, lima, vidro, cerâmica, celulose, papel, papelão, ácidos e produtos químicos orgânicos a granel Óxido de nitrogênio da aviação comercial (N 2 O) a partir da produção de ácidos nítrico, adípico e glioxílico e perfluorocarbonos de glioxal (PFCs) da produção de alumínio.
A participação no ETS da UE é obrigatória para as empresas desses sectores, mas.
Em alguns sectores, apenas as instalações acima de um certo tamanho estão incluídas, certas pequenas instalações podem ser excluídas se os governos implementarem medidas fiscais ou outras que reduzam suas emissões por um montante equivalente no setor de aviação, até 2018 o ETS da UE se aplica apenas aos vôos entre aeroportos localizados no Espaço Económico Europeu (EEE).
Fornecer reduções de emissões.
O ETS da UE provou que colocar um preço sobre o carbono e negociá-lo pode funcionar. As emissões das instalações no esquema estão caindo como previsto - em cerca de 5% em relação ao início da fase 3 (2018) (ver figuras de 2018).
Em 2020, as emissões dos setores abrangidos pelo sistema serão 21% menores do que em 2005.
Desenvolvendo o mercado do carbono.
Criado em 2005, o EU ETS é o primeiro e maior sistema internacional de comércio de emissões do mundo, representando mais de três quartos do comércio internacional de carbono.
O ETS da UE também está inspirando o desenvolvimento do comércio de emissões em outros países e regiões. A UE pretende ligar o EU ETS a outros sistemas compatíveis.
A legislação principal do EU ETS.
30/04/2018 - Versão consolidada da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 23/04/2009 - Directiva 2009/29 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE de modo a melhorar e alargar o regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 19/11/2008 - Directiva 2008/101 / CE do Conselho o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, de modo a incluir actividades de aviação no âmbito do regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade 27/10/2004 - Directiva 2004/101 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do O Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade, no que diz respeito aos mecanismos de projecto do Protocolo de Quioto 13/10/2003 - Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho ncil que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho.
Relatórios do mercado de carbono.
23/11/2017 - COM (2017) 693 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 01/02/2017 - COM (2017) 48 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 18/11/2018 - COM 2018) 576 - Relatório sobre o funcionamento do mercado europeu do carbono 14/11/2018 - COM (2018) 652 - O estado do mercado europeu do carbono em 2018.
Revisão do RCLE da UE para a fase 3.
04/02/2018 - Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de 4 de fevereiro de 2018 (ver conclusões 23 e 24) 18/03/2018 - Orientações sobre a interpretação do Anexo I da Diretiva EET da UE (exceto atividades de aviação) 18/03/2018 - Orientação documento para identificar geradores de eletricidade 06/04/2009 - Comunicado de imprensa do Conselho sobre a adoção do pacote de clima e energia 12/12/2008 - Conclusões da Presidência do Conselho Europeu (11 e 12 de dezembro de 2008) 12/12/2008 - Conselho Europeu Declaração sobre a utilização das receitas de leilões 23/01/2008 - Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da Comunidade 23 / 01/2008 - Documento de trabalho dos serviços da Comissão - Documento de acompanhamento da Proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que altera a Directiva 2003/87 / CE, a fim de melhorar e alargar o sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa da UE - Avaliação de impacto.
Implementação.
04/07/2018 - Projecto de regulamento alterado sobre a determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/06/2018 - Projecto de regulamento relativo à determinação dos direitos creditórios internacionais 05/05/2018 Regulamento (UE) n. º 389/2018 da Comissão, de 2 de Maio de 2018, que estabelece um cadastro da União nos termos do da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, decisões n. ° 280/2004 / CE e 406/2009 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que revoga os Regulamentos (UE) n. ° 920/2018 da Comissão e N. º 1193/2018 Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE 18/11/2018 - Regulamento da Comissão que estabelece um Registo da União para o período de negociação com início em 1 de Janeiro de 2018 e períodos de negociação subsequentes do regime de comércio de emissões da União nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do o Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e a Decisão 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e que altera os Regulamentos (CE) n. º 2216/2004 e (UE) n. º 920/2018 - ainda não publicado no Jornal Oficial 07 / 10/2018 - Regulamento da Comissão (UE) n. º 920/2018 para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e da Decisão n. º 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão não incluindo as alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2018 08/10/2008 - Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão para um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho e Decisão no 280/2004 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho - versão aplicável até 31 de Dezembro de 2018 26/10/2007 - Decisão do Comité Misto do EEE n. ° 146/2007 que liga o RCLE UE à Noruega, à Islândia e ao Liechtenstein 13/11 / 2006 - Decisão 2006/780 / CE da Comissão relativa à prevenção da contenção dupla de reduções das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa no âmbito do regime comunitário de comércio de licenças de emissão para as actividades de projectos no âmbito do Protocolo de Quioto nos termos da Directiva 2003/87 / CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho (n documentado no documento C (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - Versão consolidada do Regulamento (CE) n. º 2216/2004 da Comissão relativa a um sistema de registos normalizado e seguro, alterado pelo Regulamento (CE) n. º 916/2007 da Comissão, de 31 de Julho 2007, Regulamento (CE) n. º 994/2008 da Comissão, de 8 de Outubro de 2008, e Regulamento (UE) n. º 920/2018 da Comissão, de 7 de Outubro de 2018 - versão não incluída alterações introduzidas pelo Regulamento de 18 de Novembro de 2018.
Aplicação do IVA.
História legislativa da Directiva 2003/87 / CE.
Trabalho anterior à proposta da Comissão.
08/02/2000 - COM (2000) 87 - Livro Verde sobre o comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa na União Europeia Mandato e resultados do Grupo de Trabalho 1 do ECCP: Mecanismos flexíveis 04/09/2001 - Resumo do Presidente da reunião da consulta das partes interessadas (com Indústria e ONGs ambientais) 19/05/1999 - COM (1999) 230 - Preparação para a implementação do Protocolo de Quioto 03/06/1998 - COM (1998) 353 - Alterações climáticas - Rumo a uma estratégia pós-Quioto da UE Âmbito do ETS da UE : 07/2007 - Instalações pequenas no sistema de comércio de licenças de emissão da UE 10/2006 - Inclusão de atividades e gases adicionais no sistema de comércio de licenças da UE Mais harmonização e maior previsibilidade: 12/2006 - A abordagem para novos operadores e fechamentos 10/2006 - Leilão das licenças de emissão de CO2 no RCLE-UE 10/2006 - Harmonização das metodologias de atribuição 12/2006 - Relatório sobre a competitividade internacional Grupo de trabalho do ECCP sobre o comércio de emissões sobre a revisão do RCLE da UE 15/06/2007 - Relatório final do 4º mee sobre a ligação com os sistemas de comércio de emissões em países terceiros 22/05/2007 - Relatório final da 3ª reunião sobre mais harmonização e previsibilidade aumentada 26/04/2007 - Relatório final da 2ª reunião sobre conformidade robusta e execução 09/03/2007 - Relatório final da 1ª reunião sobre o alcance da directiva.
Proposta da Comissão de outubro de 2001.
22/01/2002 - Documento não oficial sobre sinergias entre a proposta de comércio de emissões da CE (COM (2001) 581) e a Directiva IPPC 23/10/2001 - COM (2001) 581 - Proposta de directiva-quadro relativa ao comércio de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa dentro da Comunidade Europeia.
Reação da Comissão à leitura da proposta no Conselho e no Parlamento (incluindo a posição comum do Conselho)
18/07/2003 - COM (2003) 463 - Parecer da Comissão sobre as alterações do Parlamento Europeu à posição comum do Conselho respeitante à proposta de directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho 20/06/2003 - COM (2003) 364 - Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu relativa à posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 18/03/2003 - Posição comum (CE ) N. º 28/2003 - Posição comum do Conselho sobre a adopção de uma directiva que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho 27/11/2002 - COM (2002) 680 - Proposta alterada para uma directiva do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece um regime de comércio de licenças de emissão de gases com efeito de estufa na Comunidade e que altera a Directiva 96/61 / CE do Conselho Faq.
Abra todas as perguntas.
Perguntas e Respostas sobre o Sistema de Comércio de Emissões revisado (dezembro de 2008)
Qual é o objetivo do comércio de emissões?
O objectivo do Sistema de Comércio de Emissões da UE (EU ETS) é ajudar os Estados-Membros da UE a cumprir os seus compromissos de limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases com efeito de estufa de forma rentável. Permitir que as empresas participantes compram ou vendam permissões de emissão significa que os cortes de emissão podem ser alcançados ao menos custo.
O RCLE da UE é a pedra angular da estratégia da UE para lutar contra as alterações climáticas. É o primeiro sistema de comércio internacional de emissões de CO 2 no mundo e está em operação desde 2005. A partir de janeiro de 2008, aplica-se não apenas aos 27 Estados-Membros da UE, mas também aos outros três membros da Área Econômica Européia - Noruega, Islândia e Liechtenstein. Atualmente, abrange mais de 10.000 instalações nos setores de energia e industrial, que são coletivamente responsáveis ​​por cerca de metade das emissões de CO 2 da UE e 40% de suas emissões totais de gases de efeito estufa. Uma alteração à Directiva ETS da UE, acordada em Julho de 2008, trará o sector da aviação para o sistema a partir de 2018.
Como funciona o comércio de emissões?
O ETS da UE é um sistema de "capitalização e comércio", ou seja, indica que ele limita o nível geral de emissões permitido, mas, dentro desse limite, permite que os participantes no sistema compram e vendam as licenças conforme exigirem. Essas provisões são a "moeda" comercial comum no coração do sistema. Um subsídio dá ao titular o direito de emitir uma tonelada de CO 2 ou a quantidade equivalente de outro gás com efeito de estufa. O limite do número total de licenças cria escassez no mercado.
No primeiro e segundo período de negociação ao abrigo do regime, os Estados-Membros tiveram de elaborar planos nacionais de atribuição (NAPs) que determinassem o seu nível total de emissões de ETS e quantos subsídios de emissão cada instalação em seu país recebe. No final de cada ano, as instalações devem render subsídios equivalentes às suas emissões. As empresas que mantêm suas emissões abaixo do nível de suas licenças podem vender seus excedentes de licenças. Aqueles que enfrentam dificuldade em manter suas emissões de acordo com suas licenças têm a opção de tomar medidas para reduzir suas próprias emissões - como investir em tecnologia mais eficiente ou usar fontes de energia menos intensivas em carbono - ou comprar os subsídios extras que precisam no mercado , Ou uma combinação de ambos. Essas escolhas provavelmente serão determinadas por custos relativos. Desta forma, as emissões são reduzidas sempre que é mais rentável fazê-lo.
Há quanto tempo o EU ETS está operando?
O ETS da UE foi lançado em 1 de Janeiro de 2005. O primeiro período de negociação foi de três anos até o final de 2007 e foi uma fase de "aprendizagem por fazer" para se preparar para o segundo período de negociação crucial. O segundo período de negociação começou em 1 de Janeiro de 2008 e é executado por cinco anos até o final de 2018. A importância do segundo período de negociação decorre do facto de coincidir com o primeiro período de compromisso do Protocolo de Quioto, durante o qual a UE e outros os países industrializados devem atingir seus objetivos para limitar ou reduzir as emissões de gases de efeito estufa. Para o segundo período comercial, as emissões do ETS da UE limitaram-se a cerca de 6,5% abaixo dos níveis de 2005, a fim de garantir que a UE como um todo e os Estados-Membros individualmente cumprem os compromissos de Quioto.
Quais são as principais lições aprendidas com a experiência até agora?
O EU ETS colocou um preço sobre o carbono e provou que o comércio de emissões de gases de efeito estufa funciona. O primeiro período comercial estabeleceu com sucesso a livre negociação de licenças de emissão em toda a UE, implementou a infra-estrutura necessária e desenvolveu um mercado de carbono dinâmico. O benefício ambiental da primeira fase pode ser limitado devido à alocação excessiva de subsídios em alguns Estados-Membros e em alguns setores, devido principalmente à dependência das projeções de emissões antes que os dados de emissão verificados estejam disponíveis no âmbito do RCLE da UE. Quando a publicação de dados de emissões verificadas para 2005 destacou essa "sobreavaliação", o mercado reagiu como seria esperado pela redução do preço de mercado das licenças. A disponibilidade de dados de emissões verificadas permitiu à Comissão garantir que o limite das dotações nacionais na segunda fase se estabeleça em um nível que resulte em reduções reais de emissões.
Além de sublinhar a necessidade de dados verificados, a experiência até agora demonstrou que uma maior harmonização dentro do RCLE da UE é imperativa para garantir que a UE alcance os seus objetivos de redução de emissões pelo menos com custos e com distorções competitivas mínimas. A necessidade de mais harmonização é mais clara em relação à forma como o limite das licenças de emissão globais é definido.
Os dois primeiros períodos de negociação também mostram que métodos nacionais amplamente diferentes para alocação de licenças para instalações ameaçam uma concorrência leal no mercado interno. Além disso, é necessária uma maior harmonização, esclarecimento e aperfeiçoamento no que se refere ao alcance do sistema, ao acesso a créditos de projetos de redução de emissões fora da UE, as condições para vincular o ETS da UE aos sistemas de comércio de emissões em outros lugares e o monitoramento, verificação e requisitos de relatórios.
Quais são as principais alterações ao ETS da UE e a partir de quando serão aplicadas?
As alterações de design acordadas serão aplicadas a partir do terceiro período de negociação, ou seja, janeiro de 2018. Enquanto os trabalhos preparatórios serão iniciados imediatamente, as regras aplicáveis ​​não mudarão até janeiro de 2018 para garantir a manutenção da estabilidade regulatória.
O EU ETS no terceiro período será um sistema mais eficiente, mais harmonizado e mais justo.
O aumento da eficiência é alcançado por meio de um período de negociação mais longo (8 anos em vez de 5 anos), um limite de emissões robusto e anualmente decrescente (redução de 21% em 2020 em relação a 2005) e um aumento substancial da quantidade de leilão (de menos de 4% na fase 2 para mais da metade na fase 3).
Mais uma harmonização foi acordada em muitas áreas, inclusive no que se refere à definição de limite (um limite da UE em vez dos limites nacionais nas fases 1 e 2) e as regras para a alocação livre de transição.
A equidade do sistema foi substancialmente aumentada pela mudança para as regras de atribuição gratuita da UE para as instalações industriais e pela introdução de um mecanismo de redistribuição que permite aos novos Estados-Membros licitar mais subsídios.
Como o texto final se compara à proposta inicial da Comissão?
Os objectivos de clima e energia acordados pelo Conselho Europeu da Primavera de 2007 foram mantidos e a arquitectura geral da proposta da Comissão sobre o RCLE da UE permanece intacta. Ou seja, haverá um limite máximo da UE sobre o número de licenças de emissão e este limite diminuirá anualmente ao longo de uma linha de tendência linear, que continuará para além do final do terceiro período de negociação (2018-2020). A principal diferença, em comparação com a proposta, é que o leilão de licenças será gradualmente mais lento.
Quais são as principais mudanças em relação à proposta da Comissão?
Em resumo, as principais mudanças que foram feitas na proposta são as seguintes:
Alguns Estados-Membros podem beneficiar de uma derrogação facultativa e temporária da regra segundo a qual as licenças de emissão devem ser atribuídas gratuitamente aos geradores de electricidade a partir de 2018. Esta opção de derrogação está disponível para os Estados-Membros que cumpram certas condições relacionadas com a interconectividade de sua eletricidade grade, participação de um único combustível fóssil na produção de eletricidade e PIB / habitação em relação à média da UE-27. Além disso, a quantidade de licenças gratuitas que um Estado-Membro pode atribuir a usinas de energia é limitada a 70% das emissões de dióxido de carbono das plantas relevantes na fase 1 e diminui nos anos subseqüentes. Além disso, a alocação gratuita na fase 3 só pode ser dada às usinas que estejam operacionais ou em construção até o final de 2008. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. Haverá mais detalhes na directiva sobre os critérios a serem utilizados para determinar os setores ou subsectores considerados expostos a um risco significativo de vazamento de carbono e uma data anterior à publicação da lista da Comissão desses setores (31 de dezembro 2009). Além disso, sujeito a revisão quando um acordo internacional satisfatório for alcançado, as instalações em todas as indústrias expostas receberão 100% de licenças gratuitas na medida em que usem a tecnologia mais eficiente. A alocação gratuita para a indústria é limitada à participação das emissões dessas emissões nas emissões totais em 2005 a 2007. O número total de licenças atribuídas gratuitamente às instalações nos setores da indústria diminuirá anualmente de acordo com o declínio do limite de emissões. Os Estados-Membros podem também compensar certas instalações para os custos de CO 2 repercutidos nos preços da electricidade se os custos de CO 2 puderem, de outro modo, expô-los ao risco de vazamento de carbono. A Comissão comprometeu-se a modificar as orientações comunitárias relativas aos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente a este respeito. Veja a resposta à pergunta 15 abaixo. O nível de leilão de licenças para a indústria não exposta aumentará de forma linear, conforme proposto pela Comissão, mas, em vez de atingir 100% até 2020, atingirá 70%, com vista a atingir 100% até 2027. Conforme previsto em Na proposta da Comissão, 10% das licenças para leilão serão redistribuídas de Estados-Membros com elevado rendimento per capita para pessoas com baixo rendimento per capita, a fim de reforçar a capacidade financeira destes últimos para investir em tecnologias amigáveis ​​com o clima. Foi adicionada uma provisão para outro mecanismo redistributivo de 2% das licenças de leilão para levar em consideração os Estados-Membros que em 2005 alcançaram uma redução de pelo menos 20% nas emissões de gases de efeito estufa em relação ao ano de referência estabelecido pelo Protocolo de Quioto. A participação das receitas de leilão que os Estados-Membros recomendam utilizar para combater e adaptar-se às alterações climáticas, principalmente na UE, mas também nos países em desenvolvimento, é aumentada de 20% para 50%. O texto fornece um complemento para o nível de uso permitido proposto de créditos JI / CDM no cenário de 20% para os operadores existentes que receberam os orçamentos mais baixos para importar e usar esses créditos em relação às alocações e acesso aos créditos no período 2008-2018. Novos setores, novos participantes nos períodos 2018-2020 e 2008-2018 também poderão usar créditos. O montante total de créditos que podem ser utilizados não excederá, no entanto, 50% da redução entre 2008 e 2020. Com base em uma redução mais rigorosa das emissões no contexto de um acordo internacional satisfatório, a Comissão poderia permitir o acesso adicional às RCE e UREs para os operadores do regime comunitário. Veja a resposta à pergunta 20 abaixo. O produto do leilão de 300 milhões de licenças da reserva dos novos participantes será utilizado para apoiar até 12 projetos e projetos de demonstração de captura e armazenamento de carbono que demonstram tecnologias inovadoras de energia renovável. Uma série de condições são anexadas a este mecanismo de financiamento. Veja a resposta à pergunta 30 abaixo. A possibilidade de excluir as pequenas instalações de combustão, desde que estejam sujeitas a medidas equivalentes, tenha sido ampliada para cobrir todas as pequenas instalações, independentemente da atividade, o limite de emissão foi aumentado de 10.000 para 25.000 toneladas de CO 2 por ano e o limite de capacidade que As instalações de combustão devem ser cumpridas, além disso, foram aumentadas de 25MW para 35MW. Com esses limiares aumentados, a participação das emissões cobertas que poderiam ser excluídas do sistema de comércio de emissões torna-se significativa e, consequentemente, uma provisão foi adicionada para permitir uma redução correspondente do limite máximo da UE em subsídios.
Ainda haverá planos nacionais de alocação (NAPs)?
Não. Nos seus PAN para os primeiros períodos de negociação (2005-2007) e segundo (2008-2018), os Estados-Membros determinaram a quantidade total de licenças de emissão a serem emitidas - o limite - e como estas seriam alocadas às instalações em questão. Esta abordagem gerou diferenças significativas nas regras de alocação, criando um incentivo para cada Estado-Membro favorecer sua própria indústria e gerou uma grande complexidade.
A partir do terceiro período de negociação, haverá um único limite para a UE e as licenças serão alocadas com base em regras harmonizadas. Os planos de alocação nacionais não serão mais necessários.
Como o limite de emissão na fase 3 será determinado?
As regras para o cálculo do limite da UE são as seguintes:
A partir de 2018, o número total de licenças diminuirá anualmente de forma linear. O ponto de partida desta linha é a quantidade total média de subsídios (limite de fase 2) a ser emitido pelos Estados Membros para o período 2008-12, ajustado para refletir o alcance ampliado do sistema a partir de 2018, bem como quaisquer pequenas instalações que o Membro Os Estados escolheram excluir. O fator linear pelo qual o montante anual deve diminuir é de 1,74% em relação ao limite da fase 2.
O ponto de partida para determinar o fator linear de 1,74% é a redução global de 20% dos gases com efeito de estufa em relação a 1990, o que equivale a uma redução de 14% em relação a 2005. No entanto, é necessária uma redução maior do ETS da UE porque é mais barato para reduzir as emissões nos setores ETS. A divisão que minimiza o custo total de redução equivale a:
uma redução de 21% nas emissões do sector ETS da UE em comparação com 2005 até 2020; uma redução de cerca de 10% em relação a 2005 para os sectores que não são abrangidos pelo RCLE da UE.
A redução de 21% em 2020 resulta em um limite de ETS em 2020 de um máximo de 1720 milhões de licenças e implica um limite médio de fase 3 (2018 a 2020) de cerca de 1846 milhões de licenças e uma redução de 11% em relação ao limite de fase 2.
Todos os valores absolutos indicados correspondem à cobertura no início do segundo período de negociação e, portanto, não levam em conta a aviação, que será adicionada em 2018 e outros setores que serão adicionados na fase 3.
Os valores finais dos limites anuais de emissão na fase 3 serão determinados e publicados pela Comissão até 30 de setembro de 2018.
Como o limite de emissão para além da fase 3 será determinado?
O fator linear de 1,74% usado para determinar o limite da fase 3 continuará a ser aplicado além do final do período de negociação em 2020 e determinará o limite para o quarto período de negociação (2021 a 2028) e além. Pode ser revisto até 2025, o mais tardar. De fato, as reduções significativas de emissões de 60% a 80% em relação a 1990 serão necessárias até 2050 para atingir o objetivo estratégico de limitar o aumento da temperatura média global para não mais de 2 ° C acima dos níveis pré-industriais.
Será estabelecido um limite máximo de licenças de emissão a nível da UE para cada ano. Isso reduziria a flexibilidade para as instalações em questão?
Não, a flexibilidade para as instalações não será reduzida. Em qualquer ano, os subsídios a serem leilados e distribuídos devem ser emitidos pelas autoridades competentes até 28 de fevereiro. A última data para os operadores renderem subsídios é 30 de abril do ano seguinte ao ano em que as emissões ocorreram. Assim, os operadores recebem subsídios para o ano em curso antes de terem que entregar subsídios para cobrir suas emissões para o ano anterior. Os subsídios permanecem válidos durante todo o período de negociação e quaisquer subsídios excedentes agora podem ser "depositados" para uso em períodos de negociação subsequentes. A este respeito, nada mudará.
O sistema permanecerá com base nos períodos de negociação, mas o terceiro período de negociação durará oito anos, de 2018 a 2020, em oposição a cinco anos para a segunda fase de 2008 a 2018.
Para o segundo período de negociação, os Estados-Membros geralmente decidiram atribuir quantidades iguais iguais de subsídios para cada ano. A diminuição linear de cada ano a partir de 2018 corresponderá melhor às tendências de emissões esperadas ao longo do período.
Quais são os números preliminares preliminares do ETS para o período de 2018 a 2020?
Os valores iniciais preliminares são os seguintes:
Estes valores baseiam-se no âmbito do RCLE aplicável na fase 2 (2008 a 2018) e as decisões da Comissão sobre os planos nacionais de atribuição para a fase 2, no montante de 2083 milhões de toneladas. Estes números serão ajustados por vários motivos. Em primeiro lugar, será feito o ajuste para levar em consideração as extensões do escopo na fase 2, desde que os Estados Membros comprovem e verifiquem suas emissões resultantes dessas extensões. Em segundo lugar, o ajuste será feito com relação a extensões adicionais do escopo do ETS no terceiro período de negociação. Em terceiro lugar, qualquer opt-out de pequenas instalações levará a uma redução correspondente do limite. Em quarto lugar, os números não levam em conta a inclusão da aviação, nem as emissões da Noruega, da Islândia e do Liechtenstein.
Os subsídios ainda serão alocados gratuitamente?
Sim. As instalações industriais receberão alocação livre de transição. E, nos Estados-Membros elegíveis para a derrogação facultativa, as centrais eléctricas podem, se o Estado-Membro assim o decidir, também receberem licenças gratuitas. Estima-se que pelo menos metade dos subsídios disponíveis a partir de 2018 serão leiloados.
Embora a grande maioria das licenças de emissão tenha sido atribuída gratuitamente às instalações no primeiro e segundo períodos de negociação, a Comissão propôs que o leilão de licenças de emissão se tornasse o princípio básico para a alocação. Isso porque o leilão melhor garante a eficiência, transparência e simplicidade do sistema e cria o maior incentivo para investimentos em uma economia de baixo carbono. É melhor cumprir com o princípio do "poluidor-pagador" e evita dar lucros inesperados a certos setores que passaram o custo nocional de subsídios para seus clientes, apesar de recebê-los gratuitamente.
Como as permissões serão entregues de graça?
Até 31 de dezembro de 2018, a Comissão adotará regras a nível da UE, que serão desenvolvidas no âmbito de um procedimento de comitê ("Comitologia"). Essas regras harmonizarão completamente as dotações e, portanto, todas as empresas em toda a UE com as mesmas atividades ou atividades similares estarão sujeitas às mesmas regras. As regras garantirão, na medida do possível, que a alocação promova tecnologias eficientes em carbono. As regras adotadas estabelecem que, na medida do possível, as alocações devem basear-se nos chamados benchmarks, p. Ex. uma série de licenças por quantidade de produção histórica. Essas regras recompensam os operadores que tomaram medidas adiantadas para reduzir os gases de efeito estufa, refletem melhor o princípio do poluidor-pagador e oferecem incentivos mais fortes para reduzir as emissões, já que as alocações não dependerão mais das emissões históricas. Todas as alocações devem ser determinadas antes do início do terceiro período de negociação e não serão permitidos ajustes ex-post.
Quais instalações receberão alocações gratuitas e quais não serão? Como evitar os impactos negativos sobre a competitividade?
Tendo em conta a sua capacidade de repercutir o aumento do custo das licenças de emissão, o leilão completo é a regra a partir de 2018 para os geradores de eletricidade. No entanto, os Estados-Membros que cumprem certas condições relativas à sua interconectividade ou à sua quota de combustíveis fósseis na produção de electricidade e ao PIB per capita em relação à média da UE-27 têm a opção de se desviar temporariamente desta regra em relação às centrais eléctricas existentes. The auctioning rate in 2018 is to be at least 30% in relation to emissions in the first period and has to increase progressively to 100% no later than 2020. If the option is applied, the Member State has to undertake to invest in improving and upgrading of the infrastructure, in clean technologies and in diversification of their energy mix and sources of supply for an amount to the extent possible equal to the market value of the free allocation.
In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.
CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.
Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.
Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?
Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.
Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.
How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?
All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.
Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?
The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.
As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.
As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.
Will small installations be excluded from the scope?
A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.
How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?
For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.
These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.
To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.
Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.
Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?
No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:
LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.
The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.
Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?
Sim. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.
Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?
A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.
A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.
The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.
Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?
Sim. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.
The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.
While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.
What is a Community registry and how does it work?
Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.
Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?
The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.
What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?
Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.
A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.
In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.
What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?
The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.
A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.
What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?
When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.
For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.
Quais são os próximos passos?
Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.
The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).

Types of emissions trading systems

11. In its Fifth Assessment Report on the science of climate change the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) introduced the concept of a total safe level of global emissions.[30] This concept underlines the desirability of working towards a global emissions trading system with the potential to cap global emissions. How such a global market might be achieved is open to debate. Broadly speaking there are two main approaches: "top-down" and "bottom-up".
12. The top-down approach was promoted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol. In theory this is one of the most efficient approaches to implementing a global carbon market. In reality it has proved unpopular because it requires countries to accept externally determined limits on their total national carbon emissions.[31] The bottom-up approach is reflected in the recent move towards wider use of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) as the basis for deciding what level of emissions reductions can be achieved globally as part of a new negotiation track in the UNFCCC (see chapter 5). At the same time numerous emissions trading systems have begun to be developed in regional, national and subnational jurisdictions around the world. Some witnesses argued that it was a suboptimal approach to developing a global carbon market because it is less efficient and could encourage "carbon leakage"[32].[33] This criticism applies equally forcefully to other forms of carbon pricing and is not peculiar to emissions trading. Other witnesses thought it was easier to implement because it avoided countries having to give up power to the UN.[34] In its 2018 report, Emissions trading status , the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) concluded:
It is becoming clear that contrary to the expectations of policy-makers and analysts in the 1990s and early 2000s, a global carbon market is unlikely to come about in a harmonized, top-down fashion. Rather, it will emerge from the bottom up, building on a multitude of systems that do not follow one blueprint, but have found different answers to questions like cap-setting, allocation, scope, and flexibility provisions, based on their own local needs and conditions.[35]
13. In future, disparate emissions trading systems emerging at the regional, national or subnational level will need to be "linked" in order to facilitate the development of a global market. There are economic benefits to linking.[36] Dr Luca Taschini, Dahrendorf Research Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment said that the benefits included creating a "bigger market" with "broader availability of abatement options" for participants. It would also reduce overall compliance costs and make the price of emissions credits more resilient to market shocks.[37] He also highlighted non-economic benefits which included "levelling the international playing field" for market participants and "contributing to the global cooperation in tackling climate change".[38]
14. Linking also presents risks.[39] It requires one party to share control over their trading system with another jurisdiction. Pooling control can create political uncertainty especially if one party later decides it no longer wants to be linked.[40] Dr Richard Leese, who represents a range of energy intensive industries, was concerned about the potential for carbon leakage which could be exacerbated by the bottom-up development of emissions trading and could see vulnerable industries that are sensitive to the price of energy move overseas.[41] While this was a concern for some witnesses, the Government and the European Commission made it clear that there was currently no evidence of carbon leakage within the EU ETS. Vulnerable industries in the EU ETS, they argued, were protected because they had been issued with allowances which exceeded their actual emissions.[42] Indeed, the carbon price in linked systems would converge so the impact on competitiveness between systems would reduce.
15. There are a number of ways in which trading can occur in linked systems. Emissions trading systems can have direct bilateral links where participants in one or both of the systems buy or sell emissions units to the other.[43] They can also have indirect multilateral links where two or more systems have access to a common international credit.[44] Finally, several countries can integrate by joining the same system.[45] The EU ETS has been responsible for most of the linking which has been achieved to date. In 2007 the EU incorporated Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein into its trading system and it is currently exploring the possibility of linking with Switzerland.[46] It also planned to link with Australia's Emissions Trading System but this was put on hold after the Australian government announced plans, in November 2018, to repeal its climate legislation.[47] There are two examples of linked systems in North America. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which held its first auction in 2008, is a cooperative effort among nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States to cap and reduce CO 2 emissions from the power sector.[48] The California and Quebec cap and trade systems linked in 2018.[49]
16. Dr Denny Ellerman, a carbon-market expert based in Italy, argued that emissions trading systems "lend themselves to linking" because the allowances can be easily traded across borders. He went on to explain:
The means to accomplish such trades and the practice of doing so with analogous financial products is already in place. All that is needed is agreement of the relevant parties to trade the allowances that each has created within their own domestic or local systems.[50]
Despite this, linking has proved difficult to achieve in practice because of the political and technical challenges that must be overcome in order to link two or more emissions trading systems together. David Hone argued that there needed to be similarities between the design elements of an emissions trading system in order for them to link.[51] Esses incluem:
& # 183; How strictly the environmental integrity of a system is maintained-through monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) standards-so that a tonne of carbon in one system represents the same tonne of carbon in another system.[52] Environmental integrity is one of the most important considerations.[53] Dr Ellerman, highlighted that, "the primary and perhaps only, criterion for linkage is the integrity of the two systems to be linked".[54]
& # 183; Whether participants in the system are able to-through registry systems and bank provisions - carry over allowances between trading periods and, in some cases, to borrow from the future trading periods to comply with a current period.[55]
& # 183; How ambitious a system is and, therefore, at what level it sets its emissions cap and how strictly it enforces this cap.[56] It would be very challenging for systems with widely differing ambitions to link because the two systems might have very different carbon prices. A price differential makes linking extremely difficult because any change in price, as a result of the link, could negatively impact the systems.[57]
& # 183; Whether a system chooses to have an absolute target versus a relative target (the latter is sometimes referred to as carbon intensity target). It would be difficult to link systems that had different types of targets. When China develops its national trading system it will probably implement a relative target at first. This would make it impossible to link to the EU ETS, at least for the time being. In the future, when China's emissions peak they may be ready and able to implement an absolute target. Adopting an absolute target would improve the prospects of linking very significantly.[58]
& # 183; The coverage and scope of the types of participants (e. g. industry, transport, land) included in the system. Respondents to this inquiry argued that linked systems should combine similar sectors, to increase emissions reduction opportunities, and different sectors to protect sectors from price shocks.[59]
& # 183; How a system decides to control the market price of allowances through cost containment measures (e. g. price floors or ceilings). Combining an emissions trading system with a price floor (or tax) is considered by some as the best way to develop a carbon market because it ensures a minimum price of carbon but still provides participants with the flexibility to choose different emissions reduction options.[60] Cost containment measures, however, have the potential to complicate linking. Actions taken to control the carbon price (such as releasing more allowances into the market to stop the price rising above a certain level) could, for example, jeopardise the environmental integrity of the system.[61]
& # 183; Whether a system will allow participants to buy offset credits (e. g. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM))[62] created in other countries or jurisdictions to use to comply with the system.[63]
During our visit to China we saw first-hand some of the pilot systems which have begun exploring the potential to link with each other. Officials in China are already grappling with these issues, despite the short time the schemes have been operating (see Annex).[64]
17. Professor Stavins highlighted that while "some kinds of harmonisation might be helpful […] less harmonisation is necessary than is commonly assumed".[65] He stressed, however, that parties looking to link have to understand the "implications" of linking and the potential impact it could have on their emissions trading system and wider economy.[66] For this reason, Miles Austin, Executive Director of the Climate Markets and Investment Association, told us that "just to link trading schemes simply to link them is not a good idea. There needs to be certain fundamental conditions that have been met".[67] The Grantham Institute on Climate Change and the Environment have developed a method by which each party is able to assess whether the other is a good match.[68] If this approach was used, Dr Taschini argued then, on average, the advantages of linking would outweigh the disadvantages.[69] DECC considered that, "the clearest way to encourage consistent design features between ETSs is for those systems that are interested in linking with others to make their intentions clear at the earliest opportunity".[70] Linking is an evolutionary process that will only occur over a long time frame.[71]
18. Currently active negotiations to develop links are limited. Professor Stavins was, however, "fairly optimistic" about linking in the future because the pressures to do so would be great from both governments and businesses. If in the future there was a robust global climate agreement (see chapter 5) all parties would want to reduce their emissions and achieve their targets as efficiently and cheaply as possible. Linking, he argued, would facilitate this.[72] As a result there would be "more and more opportunities to link".[73] Some witnesses agreed that it would be preferable for systems to link in the context of an international agreement. But even in the absence of one we may still see jurisdictions looking to link.[74] Mr Hone described how this might occur:
Over the longer term the expansion of these systems is going to be through linkage, and that is probably the area where there is most opportunity. We have seen it already: the California emissions trading system expanded by, in effect, linking with the proposals in Quebec. […]. You could imagine perhaps other jurisdictions in that area that are looking at emissions trading deciding to join that system rather than creating their own from the get-go. I think that sort of expansion is probably the direction these systems will go in—linkage between very big systems.[75]
19. In advance of a globally linked emissions trading system there would still be considerable benefit from linking the world's largest economies: China, the US and the EU. Other countries interested in emissions trading systems such as South Korea, Mexico and Brazil could then follow on.[76] During our visit to China, Chinese officials were clear that linking any of China's pilot systems or future national system was a long way off. However, they supported the idea of linking and, if possible, did not want to preclude linking in future (see Annex). Sir David King highlighted the work between the Foreign Office and Chinese officials to develop their emissions trading system "and a big part of that was about the possibility of linkage, creating a scheme that is compatible for linkage".[77]
20. Today there are a number of organisations working to promote and support linking of emissions trading systems. These include the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), the World Bank's Globally Networked Carbon Markets (GNCM) Initiative and the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP).[78] The Government also emphasised its role in promoting and supporting the development of linking emissions trading systems:
The Government has been active in encouraging the linking of ETSs. The UK has been positively engaged in all linking negotiations involving the EU's ETS, including those with Australia and Switzerland.[79]
21. As emissions trading systems develop and mature around the world there will be increasing opportunity for them to grow and expand so that emissions can be reduced in the most cost-effective way. This expansion is likely to occur by the linking of systems to one another. We recommend that the Government ensure that, when supporting other countries to develop their emissions trading systems, it promotes designs that are compatible with the EU ETS. Aligning design elements will help improve the prospects of linking in the future. The Government should focus on engaging with China and the US as the world's largest economies and because they have already embraced emissions trading.

Types of emissions trading systems

In recent years, emissions trading has become an important element of programs to control air pollution. Experience indicates that an emissions trading program, if designed and implemented effectively, can achieve environmental goals faster and at lower costs than traditional command-and-control alternatives. Under such a program, emissions are capped but sources have the flexibility to find and apply the lowest-cost methods for reducing pollution. A cap-and-trade program is especially attractive for controlling global pollutants such as greenhouse gases because their warming effects are the same regardless of where they are emitted, the costs of reducing emissions vary widely by source, and the cap ensures that the environmental goal is attained.
Report authors Denny Ellerman and Paul Joskow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and David Harrison of National Economic Research Associates, Inc. review six diverse U. S. emissions trading programs, drawing general lessons for future applications and discussing considerations for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. The authors derive five key lessons from this experience. First, emissions trading has been successful in its major objective of lowering the cost of meeting emission reduction goals. Second, the use of emissions trading has enhanced—not compromised—the achievement of environmental goals. Third, emissions trading has worked best when the allowances or credits being traded are clearly defined and tradable without case-by-case certification. Fourth, banking has played an important role in improving the economic and environmental performance of emissions trading programs. Finally, while the initial allocation of allowances in cap-and-trade programs is important from a distributional perspective, the method of allocation generally does not impair the program’s potential cost savings or environmental performance.
With growing Congressional interest in programs to address climate change—including the recent introduction of economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation controlling greenhouse gas emissions—the application of lessons learned from previous emissions trading programs is timely. In addition to this review, the Pew Center is simultaneously releasing a complementary report, Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program for the U. S., which examines additional options for designing a domestic climate change program.
The authors and the Pew Center are grateful to Dallas Burtraw and Tom Tietenberg for reviewing a previous draft of this report. The authors also wish to acknowledge Henry Jacoby, Juan-Pablo Montero, Daniel Radov, and Eric Haxthausen for their contributions to various parts of the report, and James Patchett and Warren Herold for their research assistance.
Sumário executivo.
Emissions trading has emerged over the last two decades as a popular policy tool for controlling air pollution. Indeed, most major air quality improvement initiatives in the United States now include emissions trading as a component of emissions control programs. The primary attraction of emissions trading is that a properly designed program provides a framework to meet emissions reduction goals at the lowest possible cost. It does so by giving emissions sources the flexibility to find and apply the lowest-cost methods for reducing pollution. Emission sources with low-cost compliance options have an incentive to reduce emissions more than they would under command-and-control regulation. By trading emission credits and allowances to high-cost compliance sources, which can then reduce emissions less, cost-effective emission reductions are achieved by both parties. When inter-temporal trading is allowed, sources can also reduce emissions early, accumulating credits or allowances that can be used for compliance in future periods if this reduces cumulative compliance costs. Accordingly, cap-and-trade programs achieve the greatest cost savings when the costs of controlling emissions vary widely across sources or over time. In practice, well-designed emissions trading programs also have achieved environmental goals more quickly and with greater confidence than more costly command-and-control alternatives.
Emissions trading has achieved prominence beyond the United States largely in the context of discussions regarding implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, a proposed international agreement to control emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol provides for the use of various emissions trading mechanisms at the international level. Some countries already are developing emissions trading programs while the process of ratifying the Protocol moves forward. Both the United Kingdom and Denmark have instituted greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading programs, and, in December 2002, the European environment ministers agreed on the ground rules for a European Union trading program that would begin in 2005 for large sources of CO 2 emissions (and later for other GHG emissions). Indeed, proposals to control GHG emissions in the United States also include the use of emissions trading.
The theoretical virtues of emissions trading have been recognized for many decades—the basic elements were outlined in Coase (1960) and elaborated in Dales (1968)—but actual emissions trading programs have been brought from the textbook to the policy arena mostly in the last decade. It is important to recognize, however, that while properly designed emissions trading programs can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals, experience does not indicate that significant emissions reductions can be obtained without costs. Emissions trading can be an effective mechanism for controlling emissions by providing sources with the flexibility to select the lowest-cost opportunities for abatement, but it does not make costs disappear. Moreover, emissions trading programs must be designed properly in order to realize their potential cost-reduction and environmental compliance goals. As with any emissions control program, poor design is likely to lead to disappointing results.
Experience with emissions trading, including both the design and operation of trading programs, provides a number of general lessons for future applications. This report reviews the experience with six emissions trading programs with which one or more of the authors have considerable experience:
The early Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Emissions Trading programs that began in the late 1970s; The Lead Trading program for gasoline that was implemented in the 1980s; The Acid Rain program for electric industry sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions and the Los Angeles air basin (RECLAIM) programs for both nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and SO 2 emissions, all of which went into operation in the mid-1990s; The federal mobile source averaging, banking, and trading (ABT) programs that began in the early 1990s; and The Northeast NO x Budget trading program, which began operations in the late 1990s.
Based on this experience, this report identifies and discusses five general lessons concerning the design and implementation of emissions trading programs, and two considerations of particular relevance for GHG applications.
General Lessons from Experience with Emissions Trading.
Emissions trading has been successful in its major objective of lowering the cost of meeting emission reduction goals. Experience shows that properly designed emissions trading programs can reduce compliance costs significantly compared to command-and-control alternatives. While it is impossible to provide precise measures of cost savings compared to hypothetical control approaches that might have been applied, the available evidence suggests that the increased compliance flexibility of emissions trading yields costs savings of as much as 50 percent.
The use of emissions trading has enhanced—not compromised—the achievement of environmental goals. While some skeptics have suggested that emissions trading is a way of evading environmental requirements, experience to date with well-designed trading programs indicates that emissions trading helps achieve environmental goals in several ways.
For one thing, the achievement of required emission reductions has been accelerated when emission reduction requirements are phased-in and firms are able to bank emissions reduction credits. The Lead Trading program for gasoline, the Acid Rain program for the electric industry, the federal mobile source ABT programs, and the Northeast NO x Budget programs each achieved environmental goals more quickly through these program design features. Moreover, giving firms with high abatement costs the flexibility to meet their compliance obligations by buying emissions allowances eliminates the rationale underlying requests for special exemptions from emissions regulations based on “hardship” and “high cost.” The reduction of compliance costs has also led to instances of tighter emissions targets, in keeping with efforts to balance the costs and benefits of emissions reductions. Finally, properly designed emissions trading programs appear to provide other efficiency gains, such as greater incentives for innovation and improved emissions monitoring.
Emissions trading has worked best when allowances or credits being traded are clearly defined and tradable without case-by-case pre-certification. Several different types of emissions trading mechanisms have been implemented. Their performance has varied widely, and these variations illuminate the key features of emissions trading programs that are most likely to lead to significant cost savings while maintaining (or exceeding) environmental goals.
The term “emissions trading” is used, often very loosely, to refer to three different types of trading programs: (1) reduction credit trading, in which credits for emission reductions must be pre-certified relative to an emission standard before they can be traded; (2) emission rate averaging, in which credits and debits are certified automatically according to a set average emission rate; and (3) cap-and-trade programs, in which an overall cap is set, allowances (i. e., rights to emit a unit) equal to the cap are distributed, and sources subject to the cap are required to surrender an allowance for every unit (e. g., ton) they emit.
The turnaround in perception of emissions trading over the last decade—from a reputation as a theoretically attractive but largely impractical approach to its acceptance as a practical framework for meeting air quality goals in a cost-effective manner—largely reflects the increased use of averaging and cap-and-trade type programs. The performance of the early EPA reduction credit programs was very poor and gave “emissions trading” a bad name. These early EPA programs emphasized case-by-case pre-certification of emission reductions and were characterized by burdensome and time-consuming administrative approval processes that made trading difficult. The averaging and cap-and-trade programs have been much more successful. While the use of cap-and-trade or averaging does not guarantee success, and the problems with the reduction credit-based approach can be reduced by good design, avoiding high transaction costs associated with trade-by-trade administrative certification is critical to the success of an emissions trading program. The success of any emissions trading program also requires several additional elements: emissions levels must be readily measured, legal emissions rates or caps must be clearly specified, and compliance must be verified and enforced aggressively.
Banking has played an important role in improving the economic and environmental performance of emissions trading programs. Early advocates of emissions trading tended to emphasize gains from trading among participants (i. e., low-cost compliance sources selling credits and allowances to high-cost compliance sources) in the same time period. The experience with the programs reviewed here indicates that inter-temporal trading also has been important. The form that inter-temporal trading most often takes is credit or allowance banking, i. e., reducing emissions early and accumulating credits or allowances that can be used for compliance in future periods. Banking improves environmental performance and reduces cumulative compliance costs. Moreover, it has been particularly important in providing flexibility to deal with many uncertainties associated with an emissions trading market—production levels, compliance costs, and the many other factors that influence demand for credits or allowances. Indeed, the one major program without a substantial banking provision, the Los Angeles RECLAIM program, appears to have suffered because of its absence.
The initial allocation of allowances in cap-and-trade programs has shown that equity and political concerns can be addressed without impairing the cost savings from trading or the environmental performance of these programs. Because emissions allowances in cap-and-trade programs are valuable, their allocation has been perhaps the single most contentious issue in establishing the existing cap-and-trade programs. However, the ability to allocate this valuable commodity and thereby account for the economic impacts of new regulatory requirements has been an important means of attaining political support for more stringent emissions caps. Moreover, despite all the jockeying for allowance allotments through the political process, the allocations of allowances to firms in the major programs have not compromised environmental goals or cost savings. The three cap-and-trade programs that have been observed so far all have relied upon “grandfathering,” i. e., distributing allowances without charge to sources based upon historical emissions information, which generally does not affect firms’ choices regarding cost-effective emission reductions and thus the overall cost savings from emissions trading. There are other methods of allocating initial allowances—such as auctioning by the government and distributing on the basis of future information—that can affect cost savings and other overall impacts; but the major effects of the initial allocation are to distribute valuable assets in some manner and to provide effective compensation for the financial impacts of capping emissions on participating sources.
Considerations for Greenhouse Gas Control Programs.
Emissions trading seems especially well-suited to be part of a program to control greenhouse gas emissions. The emissions trading programs reviewed for this report generally have spatial or temporal limitations because sources of the pollutants included in these programs—such as lead, SO 2 , and NO x — may have different environmental impacts depending on the sources’ locations (e. g., upwind or downwind from population centers) and the time of the emissions (e. g., summer or winter). The concerns of trading programs associated with climate change are different because greenhouse gases are both uniformly mixed in the earth’s atmosphere and long-lived. The effects of GHG emissions thus are the same regardless of where the source is located and when the emissions occur (within a broad time band). This means that emissions trading can be global in scope as well as inter-temporal, creating an opportunity for the banking of emission credits, which allows emissions to vary from year to year as long as an aggregate inter-temporal cap is achieved.
Emissions trading is also well suited for GHG emissions control because the costs of reducing emissions vary widely between individual greenhouse gases, sectors, and countries, and thus there are large potential gains from trade. While other market-based approaches, such as emissions taxes, also would provide for these cost savings, the cap-and-trade version of emissions trading has the further advantage of providing greater certainty that an emission target will be met. Moreover, GHG emissions generally can be measured using relatively inexpensive methods (e. g., fuel consumption and emission factors), rather than the expensive continuous emissions monitoring required for some existing trading programs.
Furthermore, emissions trading provides important incentives for low-cost compliance sources initially outside the program to find ways to participate, and thereby further reduce costs. This opt-in feature is useful because an environmentally and cost-effective solution for reducing concentrations of greenhouse gases should be comprehensive and global, whereas initial controls on GHG emissions will—for political reasons—likely be limited, if not to certain sectors and greenhouse gases, then almost certainly to a restricted number of countries. Therefore, an important criterion for initial measures is that they be able to induce participation by sources not yet controlled. The markets created by cap-and-trade programs provide incentives for sources outside the trading program to enter if they can provide reductions more cheaply than the market prices—a common feature of any market. Although, as discussed below, the voluntary nature of these incentives can create some problems, the ability to induce further participation is an important reason to include a market-based approach initially. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how command-and-control regulations or emissions taxes could provide similar incentives to non-participants to adopt new measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Opt-in or voluntary features have a strategic role that is likely to warrant their inclusion despite the potential problems associated with them. Experience with allowing sources not covered by mandatory emissions trading programs to “opt-in,” i. e., to voluntarily assume emissions control obligations and to participate in the emissions market, has revealed a trade-off. Setting clear baselines for opting-in lowers transactions costs and thus encourages participation; but some of this participation consists of credits for calculated “reductions” that are unrelated to the trading program and actually lead to increased emissions. For example, in the Acid Rain Program, evidence indicates that many of the voluntary participants received credits for having emissions below the pre-specified baseline even though they took no abatement actions. The simple emissions baseline had been set higher than these facilities’ actual emissions, so at least some of the credits they received did not represent real emissions reductions.
This experience suggests that the decision whether or not to include opt-in provisions should be determined by weighing the cost-saving benefits against the emissions-increasing potential. For greenhouse gases, the potential cost-savings benefits of including a voluntary element in the mandatory program are large because initial efforts are not likely to be comprehensive and global, as they must be eventually to achieve their environmental goals and be cost-effective. Opt-in provisions also have value in improving measurement and monitoring techniques, in familiarizing participants with the requirements of emissions trading, and more generally with inducing participation of sources outside the trading program that can offer cheaper abatement. As a result, allowing participants outside the mandatory GHG emissions control program to opt-in has a strategic value that has not been prominent in other opt-in programs. Indeed, it should be possible to learn from existing experience with opt-in programs how to reduce adverse effects while achieving cost-savings.
Viewed from a broad historical perspective, emissions trading has come a long way since the first theoretical insights forty years ago and the first tentative application almost a quarter of a century ago. Although still not the dominant form of controlling pollution in the United States or elsewhere, emissions trading is being included in an increasing number of programs and proposals throughout the world, and its role seems likely to expand in the future.
Conclusões.
Emissions trading has emerged as a practical framework for introducing cost-reducing flexibility into environmental control programs and reducing the costs associated with conventional command-and-control regulation of air pollution emissions. Over the last two decades considerable experience with various forms of emissions trading has been gained, and today nearly all proposals for new initiatives to control air emissions include some form of emissions trading. This report has attempted to summarize that experience and to draw appropriate lessons that may apply to proposals to limit GHG emissions. In doing so, we hope that the reader has gained a better understanding of emissions trading and the reasons for its increasing importance as an instrument for addressing environmental problems.
Six diverse programs constitute the primary U. S. experience with air emissions trading. The EPA’s early attempts starting in the late 1970s to introduce flexibility into the Clean Air Act through netting, offsets, bubbles, and banking were not particularly encouraging. Most of the potential trades, and economic gains from trading, in these early systems were frustrated by the high transaction costs of certifying emission reductions. The first really successful use of emissions trading occurred in the mid-1980s when the lead content in gasoline was reduced by 90 percent in a program that allowed refiners to automatically earn credits for exceeding the mandated reductions in lead content and to sell those credits to others or bank them for later use.
The Acid Rain or SO 2 allowance trading program for electricity generators, which has become by far the most prominent experiment in emissions trading, was adopted in 1990 and implemented beginning in 1995. This innovative program introduced a significantly different form of emissions trading, known as cap-and-trade, in which participants traded a fixed number of allowances—or rights to emit—equal in aggregate number to the cap, instead of trading on the differences from some pre-existing or external standard as had been the case in the early EPA trading programs and the lead phase-down program.
Another cap-and-trade program, the RECLAIM program for both SO 2 and NO x emissions, was developed and implemented at the same time as the Acid Rain program by the regulatory authority in the Los Angeles Basin as part of its efforts to bring that area into attainment with National Ambient Air Quality Standards. The RECLAIM program is the first instance of emissions trading both supplementing and supplanting a pre-existing command-and-control structure that theoretically was capable of achieving the same environmental objective. The standards of the pre-existing command-and-control system largely determined the level of the cap, and the program’s ten-year phase-in design and trading provided the flexibility that led to the achievement of environmental goals that had been previously elusive. RECLAIM also introduced trading among different sectors.
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act also provided enabling legislation for two other emissions trading programs. Emissions from mobile sources were more effectively and efficiently controlled by the introduction of mobile source averaging, banking, and trading programs. The mobile source programs followed the example of the lead phase-down program by allowing firms to create credits automatically for any reductions beyond a required uniform emission standard and to use these credits in lieu of more costly reductions elsewhere or later within the company and to sell them. The 1990 Amendments also provided the mechanism that encouraged states in the Northeastern United States to adopt cap-and-trade programs to control NO x emissions that contributed to ozone non-attainment in that region of the country. As was the case in the RECLAIM program, emissions trading was adopted as a means to attain environmental objectives more quickly and cost-effectively than had proved possible through conventional command-and-control regulation.
There are many lessons to be gained from the experience with these six programs, but the five most important lessons can be summarized as follows. First, the major objective of emissions trading, lowering the cost of meeting emission reduction goals, has been achieved in most of these programs. Second, emissions trading has not compromised the achievement of the environmental goals embodied in these programs. If anything, and this is perhaps surprising, the achievement of those goals has been enhanced by emissions trading. Third, emissions trading has worked best in reducing costs and achieving environmental goals when the credits being traded are clearly defined and readily tradable without case-by-case certification. Fourth, temporal flexibility, i. e., the ability to bank allowances, has been more important than generally expected, and the ability to bank has contributed significantly to accelerating emission reductions and dampening price fluctuations. Fifth, the initial allocation of allowances in cap-and-trade programs has shown that equitable and political concerns can be met without impairing either the cost savings from trading or the environmental performance of these programs. In addition, the success of any emissions trading program requires that emissions levels can be readily measured and compliance verified and enforced.
All of these five lessons are relevant when considering the use of emissions trading in a program aimed at reducing GHG emissions. In fact, emissions trading seems especially appropriate for this environmental problem. Greenhouse gas emissions mix uniformly and remain in the atmosphere for a long time. Thus, it matters little where or when the emissions are reduced, as long as the required cumulative reductions are made. These specific characteristics of GHG emissions eliminate two of the concerns that have limited the scope of emissions trading in many other programs.
Although an effective GHG mitigation program must eventually be global in scope and comprehensive in its coverage of pollutants and economic sectors, the likelihood that control efforts will be limited initially to the richer countries, the more easily measurable gases, and perhaps to certain sectors of the economy introduces another consideration. The ability to induce initially uncapped sources to participate voluntarily in the early efforts will reduce costs and prepare the way for extending the caps. Thus, providing opportunities to opt-in for uncapped sources that can reduce emissions at lower cost than those within the cap has a strategic value beyond the potential cost savings. Although some existing programs with voluntary provisions have revealed opportunities for misuse, these problems can be managed more successfully now with the benefit of experience. The strategic value of opt-in provisions in any GHG emission control program makes their inclusion highly desirable.
Emissions trading has come a long way since the first theoretical insights forty years ago and the first tentative application almost a quarter of a century ago. Since then, the use of emissions trading has expanded steadily and significant experience has been gained. Although not the dominant form of controlling pollution in the United States or elsewhere, emissions trading now seems firmly established as a valuable instrument and its future use seems sure to increase. Our review of experience over the past quarter century suggests that this trend toward greater use of emissions trading will improve the performance of environmental regulation, including efforts to control GHG emissions.

E & amp; E News.
MERCADOS DE CARBONO.
What will it take to build a global emissions trading system?
John Fialka, correspondente especial da E & E.
Climatewire: Wednesday, May 18, 2018.
More than 150 world leaders kicked off landmark climate talks in Paris last year, a world record according to U. N. officials. The deal that emerged two weeks later included language accelerating action on using carbon markets to address climate change. Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.
According to the World Bank, which has pioneered many types of emissions trading, there are 40 nations and 20 states, provinces and cities that have implemented emissions trading systems, a number that has tripled over the last 10 years.
Together these jurisdictions now produce about 12 percent of the planet's man-made greenhouse gas emissions. Their reach is expected to grow quickly as China embarks on building what could become the world's largest cap-and-trade system and as more nations and sub-nations link their systems with one another to create markets with unified rules, more liquidity and a broader reach.
SÉRIE ESPECIAL.
Uma série de seis partes da ClimateWire sobre os altos e baixos mercados de carbono, a exportação mais complexa dos Estados Unidos. Clique aqui para ler as seis histórias.
The next stage of emissions trading will involve some long and sometimes difficult political and economic dances involving politicians and businesspeople who may not fully understand the benefits and pitfalls of emissions trading. Cap and trade is a new tool, and policymakers working with it may not understand that markets can create more losers than winners if they're not well-designed and monitored.
Potential partners in this dance have not fully worked out how well-suited they might be for each other, experts say. For example, tropical nations such as Brazil, which have deeply cut carbon dioxide emissions by curbing illegal logging, have the potential for selling a great many credits that might be traded to industrial states such as companies in the European Union that may need them to meet their caps, or limits on annual emissions.
Developing such international linkages can help smooth out the performance gaps among nations that pledged in Paris in December to try and keep the global average temperatures from rising by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (1.9 degrees Fahrenheit), a key request of island nations and other vulnerable countries.
"Not everybody's got a Brazilian rainforest or a good carbon capture and storage site," explained Dirk Forrister, president of the Geneva-based International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). "So when you think long term about this, you really need these forms of cross-border trading to make it work."
Dirk Forrister, president and CEO of the International Emissions Trading Association. Photo courtesy of the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Among the world's leaders, the one who seems most eager for this dance to begin is German Chancellor Angela Merkel. On Saturday, she called for the European Union's Emissions Trading System (ETS), currently the world's largest, to link with other systems so it can become a global system.
The ETS, which has pioneered wide-scale trading, has been forced to confront and solve major problems including wide price fluctuations and to teach businesses and governments across Europe how emissions trading can be a tool to help them cut greenhouse gas emissions. Earlier this month, the European Union agreed on a deal to make further reforms, starting in January 2019.
"This instrument would of course be particularly effective if we could introduce it beyond Europe because then we'd have the same general framework around the world," Merkel said in her weekly video podcast, according to Reuters.
Merkel, who is likely to press her case for global linkage at a conference in Berlin this week, knows that some nations may be be unlinkable. Some don't understand emissions trading; others don't want to. During the recent climate talks in Paris, enthusiasts resorted to diplomatic gobbledygook to outflank determined opposition.
Avoiding bad linkages.
In the months leading up to the Paris talks, Forrister's group -- which has about 150 members, including multinational companies that will have to use trading and brokers, traders and banks needed to make it work -- spent a lot of time figuring out how to describe emissions trading. Several U. N. members, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba, vowed to oppose any mention of markets. Republican leaders in the U. S. Congress don't like the term, either. They prefer to call the mechanism a tax.
So IETA pushed to change the language of the agreement. Emissions trading didn't appear in the final Paris text. Instead, under Article 6 of the pact's annex, it says the signatories approved "cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes toward nationally determined contributions."
"It's just amazing that Article 6 came out as well as it did," said Forrister. "Eventually, those people got calmed down, so it's a huge win."
Henry Jacoby, a professor of applied economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has studied emissions trading for years, was surprised but gratified. "They walk around it, but it's there," he said.
A panel of experts discuss working toward a global market-based measure for aviation during climate change negotiations last year in Paris. From left to right: Katie Sullivan, International Emissions Trading Association; Alex Hanafi, Environmental Defense Fund; Jonathon Counsell, International Airlines Group; Ken Xie, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and Michael Gill, Air Transport Action Group. Photo courtesy of IISD.
The approval of Article 6 also caused a stir among two large quasi-nations whose cooperation with linkage and emissions trading could make a major difference in whether the Paris deal can achieve the goal of putting a limit on global warming.
The world's airlines, which produce as many emissions as a large industrial nation and have doubled passenger growth in the past decade, will need to have a big, international market where they can buy enough credits to offset their use of petroleum-derived jet fuel. There are no big commercial sources of biofuels that can fully meet their needs, but the airlines have pledged to cap their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, and then cut them in half by 2050. The International Civil Aviation Organization, a U. N. body, will announce how this might be done in October.
In March, the International Chamber of Shipping asked another U. N. body, the International Maritime Organization, to help it set a target to cap emissions because there is no worldwide alternative to using bunker fuel, which is also refined from crude oil. The world's shippers, located mainly in small offshore nations, produce 2 percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions,
Other obstacles to international linkages remain, though. There is still a split between environmental groups. Some, like the Environmental Defense Fund, have championed emissions trading as a cheaper and more effective alternative to government regulations. Others might tolerate emissions trading, but only if government mandates for specific solutions, such as more solar power, are maintained.
In Europe, the combination of these things "created all kinds of perverse incentives," according to MIT's Jacoby. The combination of the two drives up the low cost of a cap-and-trade system, which is supposed to be its chief advantage.
When the details are fully worked out, Jacoby believes, market linkages between countries or states that share similar cultures will last longer than linkages between those that don't. Bad linkages could result in countries making large and perhaps unintended financial transfers from one country to another.
"Well, what are countries willing to tolerate? You can't link systems where the prices are not pretty close," he said.
Creating a 'club of carbon markets'
Until recently, the United States, which originally launched the idea of cap and trade, was well behind Europe and Asian nations in exploring linkages. But as of January -- just before the Supreme Court stayed the Obama administration's Clean Power Plan -- at least 20 states were discussing using carbon trading to meet the climate regulation requirements. The U. S. EPA rule mandates power-sector emissions cuts by as much as 28 percent by 2030.
As for linkage between California and China or the United States and other big-emitting nations, Jacoby thinks groups such as EDF are much too optimistic about how quickly the process will emerge. EDF, he notes, has spent decades working with China.
Nathaniel Keohane, vice president at the Environmental Defense Fund. Foto cortesia da EDF.
"So that's their view, and I think it's going to come, but we're talking about decades to get to be a substantial part in controlling emissions," he said.
Nathaniel Keohane, a vice president of EDF, thinks international linkages will happen much faster, but not through the U. N. General Assembly.
"You can't have a conversation among 197 countries, most of which aren't interested in [emissions] trading," he said. Rather, he thinks, it will start with a small group of nations that can share their experiences with trading, a prestigious "club of carbon markets" that other nations will want to join to develop reciprocal standards. This was an approach that worked with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Germany recently announced it is exploring a similar idea with 17 other nations.
Meanwhile, new ideas for creating and expanding emissions trading markets keep popping up. Agriculture, which produces 9 percent of U. S. greenhouse gas emissions, is a relatively untapped source of credits in California, the biggest U. S. agricultural producer.
Rice farmers produce lots of methane, which is four times more powerful as a global warmer than CO2. Finding ways to reduce methane can produce tradable credits for industries, such as power producers, that will need to buy them to meet their state emissions caps.
But Robert Parkhurst, who works for the Environmental Defense Fund in California, says many California industries still don't understand how trading and linkages can save them money.
"Some of them are pretty small, but others are pretty large. They're not taking advantage of it," he said.
But will it get results?
Parkhurst, trained as a chemist, has experimented with both sides of the issue. He spent six years working for PG&E, the big Northern California utility that pioneered emissions trading and energy efficiency to lower its emissions. In 2018, he joined EDF in an effort to encourage rice farmers to try new growing techniques that produce less methane.
Rice farming requires flooding fields at certain parts of the growing cycle, and when that happens, bacteria in the soil and in underwater plants create methane. During eight years of research, EDF discovered that by changing the times of flooding and draining fields earlier, farmers can reduce the methane generated without decreasing rice production.
The chore of selling the new approach to farmers has absorbed Parkhurst, who showed how farmers could create another income stream by getting certification of their methane reductions and selling the resulting credits to companies like PG&E. "They're interested in change, but change is scary," he said. "They're putting millions of dollars in the ground every year, so that's why we started with science."
Then Parkhurst spent two years getting California's approval for such trading, which allows rice farmers in the mid-South to also sell credits into the California market. Next, he says, EDF hopes to develop methane reduction programs for growers of corn and almonds based on changes in how they apply fertilizers.
His method is to gain entree by forming partnerships with farm groups and accounting firms who join in the experiments. "If I were to go door to door and say, 'Hi, we're the Environmental Defense Fund,' the door would get slammed in my face," he said.
While some may argue about how long an effective worldwide emissions trading system will take to emerge, the effort has been good for the New York-based Environmental Defense Fund and its president, Fred Krupp. He has led the battle for emissions trading for three decades.
When he started, EDF had a $3 million budget and 45 employees; now it has a $140 million budget and a staff of over 500, including more economists than any other green group can tolerate.
EDF has also forged an alliance with the nation's largest environmental group, the Nature Conservancy, to work on climate policy. Since the days when he was fresh out of law school, Krupp's courting of big business and his use of economics has drawn incoming fire from some other environmental leaders. Some of them have even referred to him privately as "Fred Corrupt."
"I tend to block that out," said Krupp. "What people who care about the environment want more than anything is results."
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